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Resumo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hoje em dia, as redes de computadores têm sido, mais 
do que nunca, alvo de ataques de segurança. Estes 
ataques tornaram-se bastante complexos, e com 
diferentes tipos de motivações. Uma grande parte destes 
ataques está ligado a Botnets. 
As Botnets podem ser descritas como um grupo de bots 
que executam software malicioso autonomamente. 
Infectam maioritariamente computadores pessoais, e 
começam a executar tarefas automáticamente, sem o 
conhecimento dos utilizadores. Os computadores tornam-
se então “parte” da Botnet. 
Nesta dissertação, são descritos e analisados diferentes 
tipos de Botnets dedicadas ao envio de spam. Após 
serem instaladas, o tráfego gerado é capturado, 
processado e analisado, por forma a identificar 
características que possam diferenciar cada um dos tipos 
de Botnets. 
São efectuados diferentes níveis de análise, de forma a 
compreender todos os mecanismos de funcionamento 
destes tipos de redes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2011 Universidade de Aveiro Departamento de Electrónica,                 
Telecomunicações e Informática 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nowadays, computer networks are, more than ever, major 
targets of security attacks. These attacks became very 
complex, and with different kinds of motivations. A major 
part of the network attacks is linked to Botnets. 
Botnets can be described as a group of bots that run 
malicious software autonomously. They mainly infect 
personal computers, and start performing automatic 
tasks, without the awareness of the users. Computers 
then become “part” of the Botnet. 
This dissertation will describe and analyse different types 
of spam Botnets, by installing them, capturing the 
generated traffic and characterizing it, in order to identify 
differentiating characteristics that can be used to detect 
their activity.  
Different levels of analysis are conducted, in order to 
understand all the functioning mechanisms of these types 
of networks. 
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Chapter 1
Introdution
In the last deade, tehnology ompletely revolutionized our world. Internet beame a priority need
on peoples lives. What used to be somewhat of a luxury, to be onstantly onneted to the Internet, is
now ommon and people onnet using dierent types of terminals, like omputers, phones or tablets.
With this growth, seurity dangers started to beome more and more important, as happens in
many other types of ativities. Hakers started developing more omplex viruses, taking advantage of
the systems aws.
What used to be a question of personal reognition, got to a point where hakers use Networks of
Bots (Botnets) to rent the resoures of infeted mahines in order to obtain higher prots.
Botnets are one of the main problems of the Internet nowadays. Largest Botnets have sizable
proportions, and their main objetive is to obtain private information from the infeted mahines,
also referred to as robots (bots).
Botnets an then be desribed as a set of infeted mahines that remotely ontrolled by a main
entity, alled a Botmaster. The Botmaster is responsible for the ations performed by the infeted
mahines, whih usually means infeting more mahines for the Botnet.
Botnets rely on Command and Control (C&C) servers. This ommuniation is mandatory before
remote attaks an be made.
In order to study Botnets, we have to deide whih approah to follow. For instane, we an study
the C&C servers and their ativity, the soure ode of the Botnet or even analyse its behaviour. This
is where the researh for this dissertation was foused on. Using a mahine with the sole purpose of
getting infeted, we were able to observe various attaks and realize how they behave.
Major eorts are being made everywhere, some of them suessfully, to dismantle the most impor-
tant Botnets that have been deteted around the Internet. However, existing Botnets are ontinuously
evolving and new threats are always appearing.
1.1 Objetives
The main objetive of this dissertation is to develop a detetion mehanism that an help prevent
Botnets infetions. In order to ahieve this goal, it is neessary to have a omplete knowledge of the
Botnets ativities and behaviours. This knowledge an only be obtained by performing an analysis of
the tra ows generated by the identied Botnets.
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So, the main objetives of this dissertation are:
 Charaterize the dierent types of existing Botnets
 Identify the most ommon behaviours of existing Botnets
 Desribe in detail the Botnets that were seleted for further study
 Install the seleted Botnets
 Analyse the tra generated by the installed Botnets in the infeted mahine
 Charaterize the behaviour of the studied Botnets
1.2 Motivation
Currently, it is believed that around 25% of all omputers worldwide are infeted. Despite the eorts
that have been made to dismantle all Botnets, the main goal in this area is to dismantle at least the
biggest ones, although there are hundreds of them.
The main objetive of this dissertation is to study, analyse and understand how spam Botnets
work, in order to identify dierentiating harateristis that an be used to detet their ativity.
Hopefully, eah spam Botnet an present a harateristi behaviour pattern that an be used to
dierentiate it from other seurity threats. However, among the dierent options that an be used to
study Botnets, installing appropriate bots and apturing the generated tra seems to be the most
reliable methodology, as it will be explained latter.
1.3 Dissertation Struture
This dissertation has the following struture:
 Chapter two presents the Botnets state of the art. It will explain the dierent types of Botnets,
their evolution, their ommon behaviours, as well as the detetion tehniques that are urrently
used.
 Chapter three will disuss in detail the dierent Botnets that were hosen for analysis, explaining
why they were hosen and how will be the analysis proess.
 In hapter four, we will start by presenting the results taken from the aptures of the dierent
Botnets, making also high and low level analysis of the obtained results.
 The last hapter will present the main onlusions about the developed work. Besides, some
guidelines for future researh work in this subjet will also be given, speially regarding possible
Botnet detetion mehanisms.
Chapter 2
State of the Art
2.1 Introdution
This hapter presents an overview of Botnets, their evolution and lassiation, as well as their
behaviours and the tehniques that are used to detet them.
The term Botnet is ommonly used to speify a set of automated software robots that exeute
instrutions without human intervention. Their intentions are maliious and endanger the seurity
and safety of the Internet, so it is mandatory to build detetion mehanisms that an help disrupt
this threat.
The remaining setions of this hapter are organized as follows. Setion 2.2, gives an overview of
the dierent types of Botnets, also disussing their evolution. Setion 2.3 presents the dierent Botnets
lassiations and their ommon behaviours. Finally, Setion 2.4, disusses the main tehniques that
are used to detet Botnets.
2.2 Overview and evolution
As previously said, Botnets are a reurrent theme nowadays. They have beome the biggest threat in
the Internet at this moment.
Originally, Botnets were developed as a tool for Internet Relay Chat (IRC) hannels. However,
due to the vulnerabilities of the lients, exploits started to appear, somewhere around the year 2000.
After some time, hakers realized the potential gain they ould get by using Botnets.
As Internet users began to trade and arry on banking operations online the nature of malware
shifted from disrupting servie to exploiting these tehnologies for nanial gain. Malware may be used
to steal sensitive information, suh as redit ard numbers, soial seurity numbers, and passwords.
It then sends the harvested information to a botmaster, whih may use the information for further
attaks or may sell it to other riminals. In turn, these riminals may use the information for nefarious
ativities inluding identity theft[1℄.
And as we will see further ahead, nowadays the primary motivation for operating a Botnet is the
inome that an be earned from spam mail. Ferris Researh[2℄ laims that email spam osts businesses
over ¿95 milliards per year worldwide.
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Another popular soure of inome for online riminals is the installation of advertising software,
known as adware, on vitim systems. Many adware software ompanies oer monetary inentives for
installing their software[3℄. Phishing shemes are also a major revenue generator for Botnet operators.
Thus, what used to be a question of reputation, soon beame a question of nanial prots. The
money that an be obtained depends on the number of infeted mahines. Resoures from the infeted
mahines an be rented out to the highest bidder, for various purposes. So, it beomes easy to realize
that the bigger the Botnet is, the more money is there to be made.
We an laim that Botnets are mainly used for spamming, Denial of Servie(DoS) attaks, data
theft, as well as other rimes that will be explained later in this dissertation.
Regarding their behaviour, at the beginning of the Botnets ativity, infeted mahines generated
massive tra, but due to the appearane of detetion mehanisms, that will be disussed later in this
dissertation, they have adapted themselves and beame more intelligent. Infeted mahines started
to generate less tra in order to minimize the probability of being deteted.
A general overview of the Botnet propagation proess an be seen in the piture below.
Figure 2.1: Classi example of the propagation of a Botnet[4℄
Like it has been pointed out, Botnets send instrutions to infeted mahines, whih then send the
same instrutions to other infeted mahines, mainly through the IRC protool. The reipe of a Botnet
is usually a server and a lient program, and the program that is installed in the infeted mahines.
Usually, these three entities ommuniate between them and an even enrypt the ommuniation in
order to remain undeteted or to avoid intrusion into the Botnet ontrol network[5℄.
Botnets have a major upside, they are very eetive performing tasks that would be impossible
with a single omputer, a single Internet Protool (IP) address or even a single Internet onnetion.
Botnets were intensively used to perform Distributed Denial of Servie Attaks (DDoS) (Figure 2.2),
but measures were taken to prevent networks from these kinds of attaks, making them less eetive[6℄.
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Figure 2.2: Arhiteture of a ommon DDoS attak[7℄
In order to better understand Botnets, it is important to say something about the dimensions of
Botnets nowadays. Aording to [8℄, the top Botnets at the end of 2010, regarding the perentage
of spam, are Rustok, Grum and Cutwail. Rustok was responsible for 47.5% of spam sent in the
Internet. Its size was estimated to be between 1.1 and 1.7 million of infeted omputers. The main
infeted ountry was the United States of Ameria. However, in Marh 2011, in a joint task fore
between Pzer, the University of Washington, FireEye, several Internet Servie Providers(ISP's) and
Computer Emergeny Response Teams (CERT) around the world, Mirosoft was able to take Rustok
down. Grum and Cutwail numbers are relatively small, when ompared to Rustok, with 8.5% and
6.3% respetively. Their sizes were estimated to be between 310 and 470 thousand infetions, regarding
Grum, and between 560 to 840 thousand infetions for Cutwail. The main infeted ountries are Russia
and India, respetively.
These top three Botnets were responsible for a total 57.9 milliards of spam mails per day.
It was expeted, that with the take down of Rustok, these numbers would go down drastially,
onsidering its size. Even aording to [9℄, despite the top Botnet(Cutwail) was only responsible for
16.1% of the spam reported, and with an estimated size from 800 thousand to 1.2 millions infeted
mahines, onstrasting Rustok's 47.5% and 1.1 million to 1.7 million users, the numbers did not
hange as expeted. In detail, the overall perentage of spam only dropped from 77% to 76.6%,
however, the number of spam mails per day went from approximately 71 milliards to 45 milliards. It
is important to mention that on the 2010 report, from the grand total of 71 milliards spam mails per
day, Rustok was responsible for 45 milliards.
It is also important to mention that the main operating system targeted by Botnets is Mirosoft
Windows, mainly beause it is the most popular.
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2.3 Botnets Classiation and Behaviours
Botnets exhibit some harateristis in their ommuniation mehanisms with the ontrol server that
gives us the opportunity to distinguish them, simply by analysing their behaviour.
However, Botnets present a general ommon behaviour that is shown in the following piture.
Figure 2.3: Botnet and Bot Life yle[10℄
There has been an evolution in the network struture topologies that are used, like the resort to
P2P tehnologies. So, Botnets haraterization should also onsider the generated network tra and
their inherent topologies[11℄.
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In [12℄, the dierent types of bots were identied and listed. Next table presents that list.
Types Features
Agobot They are so prevalent that over 500 variants exist in the
PhatBot Internet today. Agobot is the only bot that an use other ontrol
Forbot protools besides IRC[13℄. It oers various approahes to hide
Xtrembot bots on the ompromised hosts, inluding NTFS Alternate Data
Stream, Polymorphi Enryptor Engine and Antivirus Killer[14℄.
SDBot SDBot is the basis of the other three bots and probably
RBot many more[13℄. Dierent from Agobot, its ode is
UrBot unlear and only has limited funtions. Even so, this
UrXBot group of bots is still widely used in the Internet[14℄.
SpyBot There are hundreds of variants of SpyBot
NetBIOS nowadays [15℄. Most of their C2 frameworks
Kuang appear to be shared with or evolved from
Netdevil SDBot [15℄. But it does not provide aountability or
KaZaa oneal their maliious purpose in odebase[15℄.
mIRC-based GT (Global Threat) bot is mIRC-based bot. It enables a
GT-Bots mIRC hat-lient based on a set of binaries (mainly DLLs)
and sripts[14℄. It often hides the appliation window in
ompromised hosts to make mIRC invisible to the user[13℄.
DSNX Bots The DSNX (Data Spy Network X) bot has a onvenient
plug-in interfae for adding a new funtion[14℄.
Albeit the default version does not meet the requirement
of spreaders, plugins an help to address this problem [13℄.
Q8 Bots It is designed for Unix/Linux OS with the ommon features
of a bot, suh as dynami HTTP updating, various
exeution of arbitrary ommands and so forth[13℄.
Kaiten It is quite similar to Q8 Bots due to the same runtime environment
and laking of spreader as well. Kaiten has an easy remote shell,
thus it is onvenient to hek further vulnerabilities via IRC[13℄.
Perl-based Many variants written in Perl nowadays[13℄. They are so
bots small that only have a few hundred lines of the bots ode[13℄.
Thus, limited fundamental ommands are available for attaks,
espeially for DDoS-attaks in Unix-based systems[3℄.
Table 2.1: Types of bots
Considering the previous table, it is important to detail some of the most typial bots.
2.3.1 Most ommon bots
2.3.1.1 Agobot
This partiular bot was programmed in C/C++[13℄. Aording to [13℄, it is so far the only bot that
resorts to a ontrol protool that uses the IRC hannel[13℄. Beause of its implementation, attakers
an very easily adapt Agobot to their purposes, due to the possibility of adding new funtions in
the related lasses[13℄. There are also various IRC ommands that an be used to ollet sensitive
information[15℄. As an example, a bot an be instruted to do some operations[15℄. Besides that,
Agobot is also able to seure the system, through the losure of NetBIOS shares[15℄. Agobot has
several ommands to ontrol the infeted mahine, whih an be related for example to managing all
the proesses or managing autostart programs[15℄. Agobot also has various features, as it has been
pointed out in [12, 15℄:
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 It is IRC-based C/C++ framework,
 It an launh DoS attaks,
 It an attak a large number of targets,
 It allows the olletion of sensitive information through tra sning,
 Has the possibility to avoid detetion by Antivirus (AV) software, by xing vulnerabilities or
even losing aess to AV websites[13℄,
 Can detet virtual mahines and avoid disassembly[13, 15℄.
To look for a new possible vitim, Agobot just needs to san a network range[15℄. On the disadvantages
side, it is not able to distribute targets among a group of bots as a whole eetively, due to its ommand
set limitations[12, 15℄.
2.3.1.2 SDBot
SDBot's soure ode is small, around 2500 lines, but its ommand set resembles Agobot[13, 15℄ and
it is published under General Publi Liense (GPL)[13, 15℄. Even though this bot does not have
the apability to propagate and has only a few funtions, it is still appealing due to their ability to
implement new ommands[15℄. SDBot has, however, some very own IRC funtions, suh as spying
and loning[11℄. The spying method basially reords the ativities of a hannel on a log le[15℄. The
loning method refers to the ability of the bot to repeat a onnetion to one hannel[15℄. In [13℄, it is
believed that this bot may be the most ative bot around the world.
This bot relies on an IRC implementation[15℄. In order to establish ontat with the IRC server,
it sends identity information, and if it gets a PING message, it will aknowledge it with a PONG[15℄.
Assuming the onnetion has been established, it is possible to request a hostname by using the
USERHOST message, and after that, join a hannel resorting to the JOIN message[15℄. One the
response ode has been reeived, the Botmaster an ontrol it through IRC ommands[15℄.
SDBot has the ability to target new vitims easily, due to its sanning tools[15℄. As an exam-
ple presented on [15℄, by using the NetBIOS sanner it an selet a random target that is in an
IP range[15℄. The SDBot is apable to send Internet Control Message Protool(ICMP) and User
Datagram Protool(UDP) pakets, whih an be used for ooding attaks [15℄.
2.3.1.3 SpyBot
SpyBot is a bot written in C, relatively small as well, with nearly 3000 lines, that is widely spread,
with various versions nowadays[15℄. In [15℄, the authors onsider SpyBot an enhaned version of the
SDBot. It has, like SDBot, the sanning ability, host ontrolling funtions, as well as modules for
DDoS attaks and ooding attaks[15℄. The host ontrolling apabilities are very similar to those of
Agobot's[15℄. However, SpyBot does not provide the same possibilities as Agobot, whih still make it
a less used bot[15℄.
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2.3.1.4 GT Bot
This last bot, Global Threat (GT) Bot, also known as Aristotles, supposedly stands for all mIRC-
based bots that have several variants and are mainly used for the Windows operating system[13, 15℄.
It has some more general apabilities like IRC host ontrol, DoS attaks, port sanning, or even
NetBIOS/Remote Proedure Call (RPC) exploiting. GT Bot also has a few set of binaries and sripts
for mIRC[13, 15℄. It is important to refer the binary HideWindow program, whih allows the mIRC
instane to remain invisible from the user[13, 15℄. The binaries are usually named as mIRC.exe, but
they an have dierent apabilities[15℄. When ompared to other bots, GT Bot has a limited set of
ommands for host ontrol, only apable of getting loal system information and running or deleting
loal les[15℄.
Botnets an also be lassied aording to the protool that is used for their ommand and ontrol
operations: Hypertext Transfer Protool(HTTP), Peer-to-Peer(P2P) or IRC. Although this disserta-
tion is mainly foused on HTTP Botnets, more speially on the ones dediated to spamming, all of
them will be presented and disussed in the next subsetions.
2.3.2 Types of Botnets
2.3.2.1 IRC Botnets
IRC is a protool used by Internet users for instant messaging. It is based on a Client/Server (C/S)
model, but it is also suited for distributed environments[16℄. Usually, IRC severs are interonneted
and exhange messages between them[16℄. It is possible that one mahine onnets with hundreds of
lients through multiple servers. The multiple IRC (mIRC) is a more omplex ommuniation ontext,
where ommuniations between the lients and the server are based on several spei hannels to
whih lients are onneted. The available funtions of IRC based bots inlude managing aess lists,
moving les, sharing lients, or even sharing hannel information[16℄.
A lassi example of a typial IRC Botnet an be seen in the following gure.
Figure 2.4: IRC Botnet propagation[17℄
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IRC Botnets were the rst to appear, but they lost some relevane over the last years. However,
they still exist and IRC is still the most ommon C&C mehanism used by bots. Aording to
Mirosoft, in the seond quarter of 2010, the number of omputers that reported Botnets detetion
follow the distribution that is shown in the next gure.
Figure 2.5: C&C mehanisms used by Botnet families aording to the number of unique omputers
that report detetions[18℄
Mahines infeted by IRC Botnets are instruted to onnet to an IRC server and a hannel, where
they wait for further instrutions, usually in the form of personalized text messages. Obviously, some
have beome more sophistiated, to prevent detetion, enrypting the bot ommands in the hannel
topi. This an be quite omplex, as they an instrut dierent subsets of bots to do dierent tasks.
The riteria that is usually used relies on the Country, network loation, the uptime of the bot,
bandwidth available, among others.
On [14℄, the four stages of the attaker's operations are desribed, as follows :
1. The Creation Stage, where the haker an add maliious ode or modify an already existing one
of the many ongurable bots over the Internet[14℄.
2. The Conguration Stage is where the IRC server and hannel information an be olleted[14℄.
While the bot is in the vitim's omputer, it onnets automatially to the seleted host[14℄.
Then, the haker an restrit the aess and seure the hannel to the bots for business or some
other purpose[14℄. As an example, the haker an list its bots to authorized users, who in turn,
an ustomize the bots as they like and use them for their own purpose.
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3. In the Infetion Stage, bots are propagated by various diret and indiret means[14℄. Diret
tehniques take advantage of vulnerabilities on servies or operating systems and are usually
assoiated with the use of viruses[14℄. While the systems are ompromised, they keep running
the infetion proess, saving the time of the haker to add new vitims[14℄. The most vulnerable
system is Mirosoft Windows, more speially Windows 2000 and XP, sine the attaker an
trak, without muh eort, unpathed or unseured users[14℄. Indiret approahes resort to the
use of other programs as a proxy to spread the bots, or in other words, they use Diret Client-
to-Client (DCC) le exhange to distribute malware on IRC networks to vulnerable hosts[14℄.
4. The last operation, the Control Stage, is where the attaker is able to send instrutions to its
bots through the IRC hannel, usually to perform some maliious tasks.
2.3.2.2 P2P Botnets
P2P Botnets started somewhere around the year 2003. They are more popular now, but they are
not the favourite mehanism used by bots. Mainly, they were reated to avoid being shut down, like
happened to other types of Botnets. Some P2P Botnets use mehanisms that derive from open soure
P2P implementations (e.g. Kademlia), while others (e.g. Waleda), have their own implementation.
A typial P2P Botnet an be observed in the next gure.
Figure 2.6: P2P Botnet propagation[19℄
P2P Botnets are still hard to study, sine there is muh less information from these Botnets when
ompared to HTTP or IRC Botnets. The rst worm related to P2P was Slapper[20℄, whih infeted the
Linux operating system bak in the year of 2002, resorting to DoS attaks. Using hypothetial lients,
this worm sent ommands to ompromised mahines, in order to reeive responses from them[20℄. Due
to this, its loation on the network ould remain anonymous, so it was very hard to monitor[20℄. In
2003, another P2P-based bot, Dubbed Sinit, was launhed[21℄. This bot used publi key ryptography
to update authentiation. PhatBot, whih has already been mentioned, appeared in 2004. Using a
P2P System, it sent ommands to other infeted omputers.
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Storm Worm is probably, aording to[22℄, the most spread P2P bot on the Internet. On [23℄,
the authors analysed the bot with dierent detetion mehanisms, and developed some tehniques to
disrupt P2P-based Botnets ommuniations, like polluting the le or elipsing ontents.
P2P-based bots are not a major onern, sine they are not well developed yet and still have
many fragilities. Hybrid or Mixed P2P networks, the ones that have a entral server or a list of peers
that an be ontated to add a new peer, still have a single point of failure for this type of Botnets.
However, in [24℄, an hybrid P2P Botnet was presented with the ability to overome this fault.
This arhiteture allows an attaker to injet ommands to any host of the Botnet. The hosts
onnet periodially to their neighbours in order to ollet orders that have been given by his om-
mander. When a ommand is issued, the host will forward it to nearby bots. The features of this
arhiteture are desribed as follows[24℄,
1. It does not require a bootstrap proedure
2. Only some bots (near the aptured one) an be exposed
3. Ease of management of the entire Botnet with a single ommand
Even though in [24℄ the authors propose various ountermeasures to prevent this type of Botnet attak,
this arhiteture still needs further researh, as well as new prevention methods[10℄.
2.3.2.3 HTTP Botnets
HTTP Botnets are the perfet example of the Botnets evolution. IRC Botnets started being deteted
and shut down, so hakers felt the urge to adapt and evolve. Now, IRC Botnets are muh harder to
detet, beause they are easily amouaged under the HTTP protool.
The following gure shows an example of an HTTP Botnet and its propagation proedure.
Figure 2.7: HTTP Botnet propagation[25℄
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HTTP Botnets are mainly dediated to sending spam mail and data theft. The biggest Botnets
dediated to data theft are Zeus and SpyEye.
HTTP Botnets are a major threat for the Internet. The volume of spam mail has reahed astro-
nomi values, whih endanger the Internet worldwide.
As previously disussed, hakers rent out their bots to third parties, but they also use it for
themselves, to infet more mahines, thus inreasing the size of their Botnet.
It is important to mention that every infeted mahine is being monitored by the Botmaster. The
Botnet is usually partitioned into subsetions, so they an be ontrolled separately. This allows the
bot owner to selet whih parts to rent or to prevent aess to valuable parts of the Botnet without his
permission. After a negotiation between the bot owner and the third party, the bot owner instruts
mahines to start a proxy server, and usually provides aess to a webpage that has the IP addresses
and ports of the bots that are part of the deal. These bots then beome property of the spammer.
And an unaware user may be in the Botnet indeterminately, sine every time there is a hange in the
IP address or in the proxy server port, the infeted mahine informs its C&C server, whih in turn
alerts the spammer with the updates.
The biggest HTTP Botnets dediated to spam are, aording to [8℄, Rustok, Grum, and Cutwail.
Rustok was shut down in Marh, so it was not used in this dissertation.
As it has been told before, hakers have several maliious intents. Mainly, Botnets are used for
either nanial and destrution purposes[26℄. There are several types of ommon attaks, whih
inlude DDoS attaks, spamming, sning tra, spreading new malware, installing advertisement
Add-ons and Browser Helper Objets or even attaking IRC Chat Networks[12℄.
A brief explanation on eah one of these subjets is given in the next paragraphs.
DDoS network attaks ause loss of servie to users, whih usually means losing network onne-
tivity and servies, onsuming the available network bandwidth or even overloading the omputational
resoures of the users systems[12℄.
Spamming relates to bots that have the apabilities to open Sokets(SOCKS) proxies on the
infeted mahines. After a proxy is enabled, usually the mahine starts relaying spam or phishing
email[12℄.
Sning tra is the ability to use a paket snier in order to observe data from an infeted
mahine. It is usually used to steal private information, like usernames and passwords[12℄.
Spreading new malware refers to Botnets that are used to launh new bots and/or malware. This
an be easily done, as all bots implement download mehanisms and exeute les using HTTP or File
Transfer Protool (FTP). Some bots an even behave as servers for malware[12℄.
Installing advertisement Add-ons and Browser Helper Objets means the assembly of a maliious
website, with some advertisements, signing up ontrats with ompanies that oer money for liks
on advertisements. In this way, the reator of the website an get some inome. This method an
be automated, where the liks are performed by several bots liking on the advertisements[12℄. It
an be easily understood that these ations an provide signiant nanial prots. This is learly a
lassi example used for nanial interests.
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Finally, attaks on IRC Chat Networks are the ones where the network of the infeted mahine
is ooded by servie requests from several bots or by several hannel-join requests issued by various
bots. This usually auses the network to go down, whih is very similar to a DDoS attak[12℄.
In order to end this setion, I think it is important to mention some numbers that an give a
real idea of the problem that we have on our hands. The average global spam perentage was equal
to 89.1% in the year of 2010, where 88.2% was generated by Botnets[8℄. After Rustok take down,
the numbers started to drop, and in June 2011, the global spam rate perentage was equal to 72.9%.
Botnets were responsible for 76.6% of that spam[9℄.
As it will be better explained in the next setion, it is urgent to develop better detetion methods
and reliable ways to bring Botnets down. Failing to do so will make the task of ontrolling the attaks
that were explained before harder to ahieve, due to their growing potential.
We already know the most ommon attaks that are performed by Botnets, so it is now time to
better understand them, see how they behave, analyse them, try to nd patterns and start to reate
eetive tehniques to shut Botnets down, in order to prevent further harm.
2.4 Detetion Mehanisms
Sine Botnets are playing a key role nowadays, their detetion mehanisms are inreasing in number
and quality.
Referene [12℄ states that due to the esalation of the Botnets, omputer seurity experts started
to develop ways to detet and monitor their behaviour, in order to gather information that an be
useful in future researh. This traking approah gives researhers the possibility to observe diretly
the maliious ativity on the Internet. It also gives researhers insight into the haker prole and
motivations. It is believed that this researh an mitigate the eets or even disrupt Botnets.
However, they also point out that this is not an easy task. These attaks an be very omplex and
an remain hidden until a ertain riteria is met.
Aording to Matt Sergeant, senior anti-spam tehnologist for Message Labs Ltd., even a regular
internet user an try to detet if his omputer is infeted. He defends that Botnets generate muh
more Domain Name System(DNS) queries than normal, so using a tool like Wireshark, this an be
easily investigated. He also points out that it is important to look out for Mail Exhange (MX)
lookups, as well as .ru, .n and .info lookups. This usually means that there is an attempt to establish
a onnetion between the bot and the C&C server. To onlude, this speialist laims that there is also
a possibility to investigate the unusual volumes of tra in a network, whih usually are generated
by the instrutions given by the Botmaster.
There are however, more sophistiated detetion mehanisms. In [1℄, some Botnet detetion meh-
anisms are explored. These approahes an be lassied as
 Host-based proedures
 Network-based proedures
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2.4.1 Host-based proedures
Host-based proedures rely on the detetion of possible anomalies on the le system.
One of the methods used to detet these anomalies is AV software. Basially, eah maliious
software running on the system has a signature, and this software an be used to detet it.
This same signature is, however, the weak point of the method, beause hakers an modify the
soure ode of the signature that is alloated to the bot. There is even the possibility that the bot
does not have a signature at all, so the AV will not be able to detet it. So, it an be onluded that
this method is not very eetive.
Another approah that must be onsidered is the dynami analysis of unknown software. This
refers to the analysis of the behaviour of the software. On the disadvantages side of this approah, we
an mention that the software needs to be installed on every system, whih generates some overhead
and makes the system degrade in performane.
Finally, it is important to mention the method that detets modiations in the Registry of Mi-
rosoft Windows. By analysing the malware binaries, it is possible to obtain relevant data regarding
IRC, suh as the username, the hannel, the DNS or even the IP addresses.
All these are reative approahes, as they an only be treated one the omputer has been infeted.
2.4.2 Network-based proedures
Network-based proedures fous on analysing the network tra, based on deteted anomalies, to
pereive if it is aused by a Botnet.
The analysis an be performed online, as the tra is generated, or the tra an be stored in
order to be analysed later. One of the proedures mentioned is the Vertial orrelation, that fous the
detetion on individual or single bot infetions. The software heks the network tra and ompares
it with preast patterns between ommuniations from the infeted omputer and the C&C server to
see if there is a similarity, whih would mean that the omputer is infeted. This approah, however,
has the same limitations as the previously mentioned signature method, beause the Botnet tra
annot be deteted.
Another proedure available is the Horizontal Correlation, whih tries do detet some infeted
omputers in the network. Network tra is analysed, searhing for similarities that an be, for
example, the same C&C server. The disadvantage of this approah is that dierent bots in the same
network don't share any relation between them, so they remain unnotied in the network.
There is also an Anomaly detetion proedure. This proedure tries to detet anomalies in the
network tra when ompared to ommon tra. In [27℄, Binkley and Singh state that one infeted
host that performs a network san is not an anomaly. However, if there are many hosts performing
a network san and they are in the same IRC hannel, this phenomenon is an abnormality ompared
to the ommon network tra.
Another omparison that an be made is to hek the ratio between the number of e-mails sent
and reeived. If this number shows that there are more e-mails sent, it usually means that there is a
spambot infetion taking plae.
A proedure that an also be made, speially for IRC Botnets, is to measure the IRC response
time. As mentioned in [28℄, a human an't respond as quikly as maliious software. So, by omparing
response times it is possible to detet the presene of maliious software.
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Chapter 3
Study of Botnets
As it has been pereived by now, there is a lot of work that an still be done. There are 3 major types
of Botnets, and thousands of variants inside them. This work ould be direted to many dierent
ways, but it will be foused on HTTP Botnets, more speially on the variants dediated to sending
spam. So, in order to analyse them, some researh is needed in order to nd the most dangerous spam
Botnets. After some researh, we found that the top 10 Botnets of the year 2010 are desribed in [8℄.
So, aording to this report, the top 10 Botnets of 2010, in terms of spam, spam per day, size and
main ountries of infetion are the ones presented in the following Table.
Botnet % of Spam/ Estimated Country of
name Spam day Botnet size infetion
Rustok 47.5% 44.1 Milliards 1.1M to 1.7M USA(17%), Brazil(7%)
Grum 8.5% 7.9 Milliards 310k to 470k Russia(12%), India(8%)
Cutwail 6.3% 5.9 Milliards 560k to 840k India(17%), Russia(16%)
Maazben 5.2% 4.8 Milliards 510k to 770k Russia(11%), India(10%)
Mega-D 2.3% 2.1 Milliards 80k to 120k Russia(15%), Ukraine(14%)
Cimbot 2.1% 1.9 Milliards 32k to 48k Italy(27%), Spain(25%)
Bobax 1.2% 1.1 Milliard 250k to 370k India(32%), Russia(25%)
Xarvester 0.5% 501 Million 17k to 25k Italy(15%), UK(10%)
Festi 0.1% 96 Million 8k to 12k Vietnam(24%), Indonesia(21%)
Gheg 0.1% 49.8 Million 8k to 12k Spain(12%), Indonesia(10%)
Total Botnet
Spam 77% ±71 Milliards 3.5M to 5.4M India(9%), Russia(9%)
Table 3.1: Top Botnets of 2010
The Rustok Botnet was immediately disarded beause it was already dismantled. Three of the
hosen Botnets are from the top Botnets of 2010. The most diult task was to nd malware that
ould be installed on a mahine in order to infet it. After some researh, appropriate malware was
disovered for various Botnets, whih at the beginning were Grum, Cutwail and Bobax. After some
time, It was deided to also install malware from the Lethi Botnet. Even though Lethi is not in the
top Botnets of 2010, it still has a signiant number of infeted mahines.
On June 2011, a new table with the top Botnets was released, onrming what was expeted.
Lethi, that did not appear on the top Botnets of 2010, jumped to number four in six months. The
updated table an be seen below, aording to [9℄.
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Botnet % of Spam/ Estimated Country of
name Spam day Botnet size infetion
Cutwail 16.1% 9.6 Milliards 800k to 1.2M India (10%), Russia (9%)
Xarvester 6.7% 4.0 Milliards 57k to 86k United Kingdom (18%), Frane (13%)
Maazben 3.1% 1.9 Milliards 520k to 780k Republi of Korea (14%), Russia (10%)
Lethi 3.1% 1.8 Milliards 230k to 340k Republi of Korea (25%), Russia (15%)
Grum 3.0% 1.8 Milliards 200k to 290k Russia (14%), India (14%)
Bagle 2.7% 1.6 Milliards 140k to 200k India (15%), Argentina (8%)
Fivetoone 2.3% 1.4 Milliards 94k to 140k Vietnam (20%), Brazil (12%)
Festi 1.2% 691 Millions 25k to 37k India (10%), Vietnam (10%)
Bobax 0.4% 254 Millions 80k to 120k Ukraine (27%), India (18%)
DarkMailer 0.5% 43 Millions 1k to 1.5k Frane (27%), USA (16%)
Total Botnet
Spam 76.6% ±45 Milliards
Table 3.2: Top Botnets of June 2011
The dierene between both tables, in only six months, is lear, reinforing the idea that Botnets
are onstantly hanging. The Botnets used in this dissertation are all in the top 10, aording to
June's report. Cutwail gained a lot of importane in the earlier months of this year, but none of the
atual Botnets aomplish even half of what Rustok has aomplished. Meanwhile, it was expeted
to see a deline on the perentage of Botnet spam on the Internet, but the dierene is only of 0.4%.
What was more notieable was the redution of spam per day, whih dropped from 71 Milliards to 45
Milliards.
Finally, a trojan was also installed and analysed. The trojan name is Kazy and it will help
understand better the ativity of a bot.
So, four Botnets were onsidered in this dissertation, as shown in the following Table.
Botnet name Aliases
Grum Tedroo
Cutwail Pandex/Pushdo
Bobax Kraken/Oderoor
Lethi N/A
Table 3.3: Botnets analysed
Before going into the details of eah Botnet, is it important to present some details about the Kazy
trojan.
3.1 Trojan details
3.1.1 Kazy
The following sentene an be used to ompare a trojan to a bot: A bot is also known as a remote-
aess Trojan horse program[29℄. This spei trojan, Kazy, downloads maliious les from a remote
server, installs and exeutes them.
Kazy is a bakdoor trojan, well known for attaking online bank-related information[30℄. This
trojan an be distributed in many ways, suh as maliious sripts on dubious sites, like advertisements,
or as part of an installation pakage[30℄. This trojan is usually inluded in the form of a link to an .exe
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le. When installing itself, it usually resorts to a fake .gif format indiator and the name iexplorer.exe,
whih is slightly dierent from the Internet Explorer proess (iexplore.exe)[30℄. The major problems
of this trojan that have been reported are the deletion of important les from anti-malware, anti-virus
or anti-spyware programs. This makes it very hard to remove this trojan, turning the seurity of
the infeted mahine into a very fragile element. Another reported problem is browser rediretion
to phishing sites. This Kazy behaviour is very well known, onsisting usually in the use of phishing
sams that are presented in the form of fake online bank login pages. However, these expedients an
be easily deteted by looking into the web address[30℄. Aording to [30℄, Brazil based banks are
privileged targets of the Kazy phishing attempts.
A ouple of known aliases for Kazy are Trojan.Win32.Pakes.oya, Trojan.Fakealert.20587,Mal/FakeAV-
IK, Generi22.YJ and Win32/Kryptik.MLF[30℄.
3.2 Botnets details
In order to better understand these Botnets, it is important to give a brief bakground on eah of
them.
3.2.1 Grum
Grum, also known as Tedroo, is an HTTP Spam Botnet, whih mainly fous its spam on pharma-
eutial produts. It usually infets les referened by the auto-run registries. This Botnet is able
to hide omponent les as well as legitimate windows system les, making its detetion and removal
quite diult[31℄. It has ve key features[31℄:
 A Kernel-based root-kit
 Reports to a C&C server via HTTP on port 80
 Downloads plain text spam templates and address lists from a web-server
 Has multiple ontrol servers
 Performs DNS MX lookups to send spam.
The behaviour of this Botnet has already been analysed, so it is known that this Botnet will try to
establish a ontrol server onnetion, using an email message, by sending an HTTP request message.
Depending on the variant of the Botnet, Grum makes hanges in the System Registry[31℄.
3.2.2 Cutwail
Cutwail, also referred as Pandex or Pushdo, among other names, is also an HTTP Spam Botnet. It has
been working sine 2007[32℄. It fouses mainly in sending spam promoting pharmaeutials, designer
rip-os or even software. It also distributes malware regularly, sending attahments in emails, usually
a .zip le. It usually resorts to elebrity names to deeive users. Nowadays, these Botnets also send
maliious ampaigns, using soial networking brands. They also distribute phishing emails, mainly
targeting ustomers of several nanial institutions[32℄. The main Cutwail's features are[32℄:
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 Reports to a C&C server on port 80, resorting to enrypted HTTP
 Performs DNS lookups to send spam and uses templates.
In [32℄, the Cutwail behaviour is desribed. Bots onnet to the ontrol server using HTTP, through
port 80, resorting to an enrypted tunnel and listen on a random UDP port for ommands from the
ontrol server. The host is apable of downloading malware and, after installing it, it reates dierent
proesses[32℄, mainly with the purpose of notifying the Botmaster and running its ommands.
3.2.3 Bobax
Bobax, whih an also be found under the name of Kraken or Oderoor, is another HTTP Spam Botnet.
Reportedly, it has been working sine 2007 and had its peak in 2008[33℄. During the last semester of
this year, it was responsible for 5-10% of all generated spam. It started attrating a lot of attention,
whih lead to the disruption of its ontrol servers in the end of 2008[33℄. Bobax is still around as one
of the top Botnets of 2010, but it is responsible for only 1.2% of spam nowadays, whih plaes it in
the 7th plae. The main Bobax features are[33℄:
 Reports to ontrol server on UDP, through port 447
 Uses dynami domain name providers for domains
 Performs DNS MX lookups to send spam
 Has multiple reipients per message
 Uses templates
 Has bakdoor apabilities.
Bobax starts by heking for a Simple Mail Transfer Protool(SMTP) onnetion to a server site,
through port 25. Then it generates a pseudo-random domain name, and if the DNS query fails, it
will append the domain name on the loal network of the infeted mahine to perform a new DNS
query. One it suessfully nds the C&C server, it sends an HTTP request[33℄. Like in Cutwail, it
reates proesses to exeute on Windows start-up, and hides its malware registering itself as a random
servie name. It also has the apability of searhing for potential email addresses. After this proess,
it reeives a template from the server to send to its targets.
3.2.4 Lethi
Lethi is an HTTP Spam Botnet that is suspeted to exist for quite some time already. It is a
proxy type spambot, that relays spam from a ontrol server to its destination[34℄. It mainly sends
pharmaeutial and replia wathes spam emails. Even though it is not present on the top Botnets of
2010[8℄, at the beginning of 2010 Lethi was responsible for about 8-10% of total spam[34℄. However,
this is due to the fat that Lethi has been dismantled somewhere near January 2010. Meanwhile,
Lethi was revived in February of 2010.
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In [34℄, its main features are desribed as follows:
 Ats as a proxy relay spam
 Proess injetion to Explorer.exe
 Fast, multi-threaded
 Anti-debugging and Anti-Virtual Mahine detetion.
After the infetion, the ompromised mahine onnets to dierent domains. The ommuniation
protool is ustomised. When onneted, the ontrol server initiates the handshaking proess and
gives the bot an IP address and port to forward the data to, hene making it work as a proxy[33℄.
An the host, it starts by installing the malware on the Windows System diretory. As happened in
all other Botnets, it reates a registry entry to exeute les on Windows start-up. Lethi also has the
apability to injet its ode into explorer.exe, and reate random proesses in the infeted mahine[33℄.
3.3 Analysis Methodology
The main objetive of this dissertation is to analyse dierent Botnets by looking at the statistis of
the generated tra. This is a passive approah. We have onneted a mahine to the Internet with
the only purpose of getting infeted. Like it has explained before, some bots have the ability to detet
Virtual Mahines(VM). Thus, in order to get aurate results, no VM's were used in any ase. The
used mahine was always formatted before eah manipulated infetion, in order to prevent interferene
between the tra generated by dierent Botnets.
The operating system used was always Mirosoft Windows XP Servie Pak 2, sine it is the most
targeted operating system.
At the very beginning, a apture of one hour was made in order to observe the typial tra
generated by the omputer immediately after being formatted. After this rst step, we searhed for
dierent malware from the dierent Botnets. In [35℄, there is a fairly good database of malware. The
next step was to set the aptures to last for 48 hours. This time was hosen beause it gives the
possibility to better infer the behaviour of the Botnet and observe their patterns along a longer time
line.
No other task was being performed on the infeted omputer while it was apturing, in order to
redue other generated tra besides the Botnet tra. So, apart from the tra generated by the
Botnets, there was very little tra being generated. Obviously, any other tra was disarded in
the statistis alulated in Chapter 4.
At least two aptures for eah Botnet were made, in order to observe any dierenes that an
our in their behaviours.
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Chapter 4
Experimental results
This hapter will analyse the tra that was aptured for the dierent Botnets seleted in this disser-
tation. Tra was stored in order to be analysed a posteriori. The onduted analysis is a multi-level
one, looking at high and low level details. Regarding the high level analysis, the following statistis
of the aptured tra were analysed:
 Protools details
 Pakets per hour and per minute
 Amount of tra transferred per hour and per minute
 Unique peers per hour
 Transmission Control Protool(TCP) Session Establishment attempts
 Geographial loation of the ontated peers.
The protools details will help understand some of the Botnet ativities and objetives by looking
at the protools that are used in the dierent ommuniations. Using the aptures that were made,
and reating a sript for ltering them by Protool, it was possible to get the dierent amount of
pakets over time per ommuniation protool. It is important to refer that in the following analysis
the referenes to TCP (unknown) and UDP (unknown) refer to non identied pakets and should not
be onfused with the sum of protools from eah layer. So, the seleted lter was able to analyse the
paket header and return the Protool to whih it belongs to.
The pakets per hour and per minute allow us to verify the behavioural pattern of the Botnet over
time. This was aomplished by reating a sript that ltered the amount of pakets generated per
hour and per minute, plotting them onveniently. In order to better illustrate the Pakets per minute
statisti, a sample of the rst two hours was also made by simply ltering the pakets orresponding
to the rst 120 minutes.
The amount of tra transferred per hour and per minute follow the same proedure of the previous
statisti. The sript was similar, and the only hange that was made to the lter was using the amount
of generated data instead of the amount of pakets.
The unique peers will help us realize how spread and large the Botnet is. In order to observe this,
another sript was made, ltering the IP addresses per hour from the stored aptures and plotting
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them over time. In this proedure, it was deided to report only the number of peers per hour and
distinguish them as Inbound and Outbound.
It was also important to analyse the TCP Session Establishment attempts, dierentiating the
onnetions that were established from the unsuessful onnetion attempts. In order to obtain this
statisti, we had to lter the SYN pakets from the SYN/ACK and RST/ACK pakets. TCP session
establishment follows the three way-handshake sheme illustrated in the following gure.
Figure 4.1: TCP Session Establishment diagram
The ACK pakets were not onsidered for this analysis. In fat, the number of ACK pakets an
be easily manipulated by hanging the ag bits in order to obtain a partiular value. In our proedure,
we split the TCP SYN pakets sent from the infeted mahine from the TCP SYN pakets reeived
at the infeted mahine.
Finally, a World Map showing the geographial loation of the ontated peers was built in order
to observe the geographial relevane of eah Botnet. This was possible by resorting to a tool in
Python[36℄that allows to know the peers geographial loation based on their IP addresses. With a
sript, providing GnuPlot's world map and the tool for getting the IP address oordinates, it was
possible to pin down these oordinates in the map.
In order to better understand the Botnet behaviour, it was deided to split the tra originated
in the infeted mahine from the tra that is destined to the infeted mahine. Hene, for further
referene, we will desribe them as the Upload and Download tra, respetively. On the World Map,
this distintion was made by using blak dots for the Outbound onnetions and red dots for the
Inbound onnetions.
In the low level analysis, we deided to analyse the following stati/metri:
 Salograms
Salograms are a visual method of displaying wavelet transforms. They have three axes, representing
time, sale and the energy oeients. This is one method of using wavelet analysis to obtain spetral
information. Salograms allows us to analyse wavelets in dierent sales of frequeny and time. They
also help detet the variane of a signal.
An analysis of the variane and mean of the energy of the salograms was also made. Only the
rst ten hours of the aptures were onsidered to build the salograms.
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All these analysis were possible due to the use of Tshark to apture the generated tra, Matlab
and GnuPlot to make the graphis of the dierent statistis and Python to write sripts that are used
to extrat all the neessary information from the generated tra.
Next setions will present the analysis that was made to the tra generated by eah Botnet,
together with a disussion of the results obtained.
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4.1 Grum
As it has been said before, the malware from this Botnet was installed immediately after the omputer
was formatted. Tra was aptured during 48 onseutive hours, in order to make a deeper analysis.
The malware used was downloaded from the site [35℄ on July 2011.
This malware had a partiular harateristi: every time it was exeuted, it reated a new proess,
disguised under the name of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe).
Although we have repeated the same proess from srath, the tra obtained in the seond
apture was very similar to the rst one, so only one apture will be presented and analysed.
4.1.1 General analysis
The rst task when analysing the aptures obtained from Grum was to see how tra behave over
time. By analysing the whole apture, it was possible to take the following onlusions.
Immediately after installing the malware, DNS queries started being made to one of Google's DNS
(8.8.8.8) during 100 seonds, with a periodiity of 50 seonds. Then, most of the tra that was ltered
as TCP Unknown in the high-Level analysis used port 80, so we an onlude that it is HTTP tra.
The known HTTP tra was generated during 150 seonds, also with a periodiity of 50 seonds,
making various GET requests for dierent types of les (.exe, .gif, .png). After some time, Unknown
TCP pakets, direted through port 445, were exhanged. Therefore, we were seeing a ommuniation
of Server Message Blok (SMB) over TCP/IP. Right after this exhange, the SMB ommuniation
began. A series of requests and responses were exhanged. The objetive of this ativity was to nd
shared les. A Session Initiation Protool (SIP) paket was then reeived, inluding the information
that is neessary to get options from an IP address. This pakets ontinued to appear sporadially.
Besides, several attempts for Seure Shell (SSH) and Telnet onnetions were also made. Reurrently,
there were some pakets being exhanged through port 6000, whih has been reported as a port used
by virus or trojans. Some SMTP pakets were also deteted over time, reinforing the idea of spam
intents.
The apture made followed a regular trend, with the vast majority of the pakets belonging to
HTTP and SMB. These pakets ontinuously queried servies through NetBIOS Name Servie (NBNS)
and tried to establish sessions through NetBIOS Session Servie (NBSS). There were some exeptions
that will be disussed later.
Before presenting the statistis that were extrated, we an onlude that this Botnet performed
somewhat like we expeted it to, onsidering that its tra is mostly HTTP, it performs DNS lookups
and the ountries of infetion are mainly loated in the same ontinents that have been reported in
the literature. The number of SMTP pakets was expeted to be higher, but the most important issue
is that these pakets are present.
4.1.2 High-Level Analysis
First of all, we analysed the protools involved in the tra that was generated by this Botnet.
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Figure 4.2: Protools(Upload), Grum Botnet
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Figure 4.3: Protools(Download), Grum Botnet
Regarding these two pitures, it is learly visible that most of the generated tra was ltered
as unknown TCP. In the Upload diretion, there are some HTTP and DNS pakets in the rst hour.
Then, besides unknown TCP, there are also some SMB and unknown UDP pakets.
In the Download diretion, it is also possible to observe some few pakets from three dierent
protools (HTTP, DNS and SMB), although this only happens in the rst hour.
As it has been previously said, most of the unknown TCP pakets are really HTTP or SMB
pakets.
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The next proedure onsisted in analysing the number of pakets generated per hour and per
minute.
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Figure 4.4: Pakets per hour, Grum Botnet
In this piture, it is visible that the number of generated pakets inreased as time progressed, and
there were always more Download than Upload pakets. There are peaks in the amount of generated
tra around the 23th, 37th and 43nd hour.
In these peaks, it is possible to observe an inrease of SMB session requests, as well as Remote
Management requests.
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Figure 4.5: Pakets per minute, Grum Botnet
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Figure 4.6: Sample of pakets per minute, Grum Botnet
By observing these last two pitures, we an onlude that this Botnet does not generate a signi-
ant amount of tra per minute, exept on some peaks that our over time, as previously explained.
From the aptured pakets, it is also important to observe the amount of generated data. The
analysis made follow the same riteria of the previous proedure.
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Figure 4.7: Amount of tra per hour, Grum Botnet
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Figure 4.8: Amount of tra per minute, Grum Botnet
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Figure 4.9: Sample of amount of tra per minute, Grum Botnet
From these three pitures we an observe that Grum generated a very limited amount of tra,
around 10KB per hour. As expeted from the amount of reeived pakets, the amount of download
tra was always higher than the amount of upload tra.
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Next graph shows the amount of unique peers ontated over time.
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Figure 4.10: Unique peers per hour, Grum Botnet
We an see that there was a fairly regular amount of peers ontated per hour, exept for the peak
on the 28th hour, where six times more peers were ontated than usual. This peak was the result of
the attempts of TCP Session Establishment that were not suessful.
Another proedure that is useful to better understand the behaviour of this Botnet is to analyse
the TCP Session Establishments. This analysis an be seen in the following pitures.
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Figure 4.11: TCP Session Establishment(Outbound), Grum Botnet
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In the previous piture, it is lear that most of the pakets generated in response to SYN pakets
were SYN/ACK, so the session establishments followed the expeted behaviour.
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Figure 4.12: TCP Session Establishment(Inbound), Grum Botnet
In the Inbound piture, we see that most of the time there are more RST/ACK pakets than
SYN/ACK, whih means that most of the session establishments attempts were not suessful. Like
we said before, there is a strange peak of 60 peers ontated per hour, whih is due to these high
number of RST/ACK pakets. In the 28th hour of this apture, a total of 84 RST/ACK pakets were
sent from the infeted mahine.
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To onlude the High-Level analysis, it is interesting to see a world map that shows the geographial
loation of the peers that established ommuniation with the infeted mahine.
Figure 4.13: World Map, Grum Botnet
It is pereivable that Grum's infeted mahines are primarily loated in Europe, Asia and Ameria.
The main infeted ountries reported in this apture are China and the United States of Ameria.
The loation of the Inbound and Outbound peers was very similar,so we deided to present only
one of these statistis.
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4.1.3 Low-Level Analysis
The salogram for this apture is shown in the next piture.
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
0
50
100
Analyzed Signal
Scalogram 
Percentage of energy for each wavelet coefficient
Time (or Space) b
Sc
al
es
 a
 
 
100 200 300 400 500 600
 1
 5
 9
13
17
21
25
29
33
37
41
45
49
53
57
61
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Figure 4.14: Salogram, Grum Botnet
The inrease of energy perentage around the rst minutes of the sample is learly visible, whih
indiates the high variane at the beginning of the apture. There are also some smaller variane
peaks ourring at minutes one hundred, four hundred and ve hundred. This salogram allow us to
learly see the variane of the signal over time.
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Figure 4.15: Energy Mean, Grum Botnet
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Figure 4.16: Energy Variane, Grum Botnet
The mean and variane of the energy were also analysed. We an see in the last two pitures
that the mean is quite dierent for the various oeients of energy. The variane of the energy has
signiant values.
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4.2 Cutwail
One again the omputer was formatted and the malware orresponding to this Botnet was installed.
Generated tra was aptured for 48 hours, in order to make a deeper analysis of this Botnet be-
haviour. The malware used was downloaded from [35℄ on July 2011.
The seond apture that was made produed dierent values, so both aptures will be presented
in order to show their dierent behaviours. This proves that even though Botnets have a behavioural
pattern, they have the apability to behave dierently under similar irumstanes.
4.2.1 General analysis
Analysing the aptures obtained from Cutwail, the main objetive was to see how it behaved over
time. After the omplete analysis, it was possible to take some important onlusions.
In the rst apture, just after the malware has been installed, NBNS requests to the infeted
mahine router started to be exeuted every 700 seonds, in order to obtain information from other
mahines in the network. It was possible to see that port 59022 was used for SSH ommuniation,
after opening the rewall and allowing SSH in that spei port. The Unknown UDP pakets that
will be shown in the statistis atually refer to DoS attaks. Many of the used ports are known to
be frequently used for DoS attaks, so we believe that the main objetive was to disrupt the servies
running on the infeted mahine.
At hour 11, there is a SIP paket inluding the information that is neessary to get options from an
IP address. At hour 15, there are a ouple of Simple Network Management Protool (SNMP) pakets
to make requests. Starting in hour 29, most of the Unknown TCP pakets are atually SSH and Telnet
pakets, attempting to make remote onnetions with the infeted mahine. Finally, at the 45th hour
the Unknown TCP pakets are not any more SSH and Telnet, but are now HTTP pakets. There are
only a ouple of SMTP pakets, whih onrms the idea that the main purpose of this Botnet is to
disrupt servies.
In the seond apture, what was more ommon when analysing tra was the presene of HTTP
pakets. Atually, most of the Unknown TCP pakets are in fat HTTP pakets. After a ouple of
hours, some HTTP/XML Notify pakets were spontaneously exhanged. There were a ouple of SIP
pakets as well, with both the OPTIONS information and INVITE. A ouple of Telnet pakets were
also seen in the rst hours, but nothing too suspiious. There were some NBNS Query pakets as
well, also using port 445, and a signiant amount of SMB over TCP/IP pakets were also deteted.
Regarding Unknown UDP tra, most of it was atually being exhanged for DoS attaks. Many
of the ports were reognized as the ones that are usually used for this type of attaks.
Around the third hour of the apture, a lot of Unknown TCP pakets started being direted
through port 50000, known for being used by a trojan named SubSARI. This ativity lasted until
hour nine, where this port stopped being used almost at all. By the end of the apture, there were
some Remote Management pakets. To onlude, one again SMTP pakets were deteted but now
in a smaller quantity.
We an onlude that this Botnet did behave like it was expeted, onsidering the amount of
HTTP tra, the DNS lookups, DoS attaks and also the ountries of infetion, whih were mainly
foused on the same ontinents there were reported in [8℄. The only exeption was that more SMTP
tra was expeted, leading us to suspet that this Botnet did not perform exatly at it should.
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4.2.2 High-Level Analysis
Following the same proedure of the previous Botnet, we rst analysed the protools involved in the
generated tra.
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Figure 4.17: Protools(Upload), Cutwail Botnet
As we an see in the rst apture, the mostly used Protool is Unknown TCP, whih has an errati
behaviour. Then, in some time frames we have Unknown UDP pakets as well as DNS pakets. Like
we already disussed, mainly this Unknown TCP pakets are really SSH, Telnet and HTTP pakets.
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Figure 4.18: Protools(Upload), Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
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Contrasting to the rst apture, the seond apture shows a perfet example of a simple behavioural
pattern. It has a onstant rate of sent HTTP pakets and the Unknown TCP pakets, despite having
a peak near the 26th hour, also follow a simple pattern. There is a small rate of SMB and Unknown
UDP pakets. The latter has a peak around the 25th hour as well.
This peak is aused by TCP Session Establishments, whih will be disussed below.
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Figure 4.19: Protools(Download), Cutwail Botnet
This is an interesting piture. Despite the reeived pakets, not even a single paket from the
Protools shown in the gure was sent by the infeted mahine. The only pakets sent from the
infeted mahine were NBNS pakets.
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Figure 4.20: Protools(Download), Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
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This last piture is very similar to the Upload one, exept in the absene of the Unknown UDP
pakets peak.
In the last four pitures, it was possible to understand the importane of making several aptures
of the same Botnet. There were some signiant dierenes between both aptures, although the
general behaviour remains the same. The most present Protool is one again Unknown TCP.
Like we already disussed, most of the Unknown TCP tra is atually HTTP, while Unknown
UDP is mostly sent through dierent ports in order to perform DoS attaks.
Analysing now the number of pakets generated per hour and per minute, we obtained the following
statistis.
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Figure 4.21: Pakets per hour, Cutwail Botnet
In the rst apture, we an observe a onstant pattern of pakets sent per hour. The number of
pakets reeived has, however, an unpreditable pattern.
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Figure 4.22: Pakets per hour, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
In this piture we an observe that both sent and reeived pakets follow the same pattern, and both
have a peak in the 26th hour. One again, this peak is originated by the TCP Session Establishment
attempts. There was almost always more Upload than Download pakets.
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Figure 4.23: Pakets per minute, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.24: Pakets per minute, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
These last two images better expliit the behaviour along the 48 hours of the apture, whih was
not very lear yet, speially in the rst apture.
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Figure 4.25: Sample of pakets per minute, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.26: Sample of pakets per minute, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
These two samples from the rst two hours are useful to learly see the behaviour of Cutwail
minute by minute.
Moving now to the amount of generated data, we an see that these two images are very similar
to the ones orresponding to the amount of pakets per hour.
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Figure 4.27: Amount of tra per hour, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.28: Amount of tra per hour, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
The dierenes are that in the rst apture there is always a high quantity of Uploaded tra
than Downloaded, while in the seond apture it is exatly the opposite situation.
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Figure 4.29: Amount of tra per minute, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.30: Amount of tra per minute, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
 1.8
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
By
te
s(K
B)
Minutes
Download
Upload
Figure 4.31: Sample of amount of tra per minute, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.32: Sample of amount of tra per minute, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
These last pitures have the same objetive as the ones orresponding to the pakets by minute and
its orresponding samples. Cutwail generated a very small amount of tra, whih an be onrmed
in the last six pitures.
The amount of unique peers ontated over time was also analysed and an be seen in the next
two pitures.
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Figure 4.33: Unique peers per hour, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.34: Unique peers per hour, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
We an observe that both aptures have a regular number of peers ontated per hour. In the rst
apture, there was a peak around hour 29, whih resulted in six times more peers than usual. In the
seond apture, there was also a peak around the 25th hour, inreasing the amount of ontated peers
by twenty times.
These peaks were a result of an inrease of TCP Session Establishment attempts.
It is also important to state that both aptures ontated around the same number of peers per
hour, exept at the moments when the peaks ourred.
Another analysis referred to the TCP Session Establishment phase. The results an be seen in the
following pitures.
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Figure 4.35: TCP Session Establishment(Outbound), Cutwail Botnet
In this rst ase, all the Session Establishment attempts were replied by a SYN/ACK paket,
exept for two pakets.
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Figure 4.36: TCP Session Establishment(Outbound), Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
In this piture it is learly visible that most of the generated pakets in response to SYN pakets
has the SYN/ACK ags ative, although there were also RST/ACK pakets, but in a very low number.
There was however a large number of unanswered SYN pakets. This is not a ommon behaviour and
should be an alarm for Botnet ativity.
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Figure 4.37: TCP Session Establishment(Inbound), Cutwail Botnet
In this ase, all reeived SYN pakets were not answered bak. Like it was already explained, the
infeted mahine in this apture only sent NBNS pakets and nothing else.
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Figure 4.38: TCP Session Establishment(Inbound), Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
In this last piture, we see that there are always more RST/ACK than SYN/ACK pakets. Atu-
ally, almost all reeived SYN pakets were replied with RST/ACK pakets, whih means that most of
the session establishments attempts were not suessful.
It was seen before a peak around hour 25 in the seond apture, whih onduted to this inrease
in the number of SYN and RST/ACK pakets.
To nish this High-Level analysis, it is important to observe the world map that shows the loation
of the peers that ommuniated with the infeted mahine.
Figure 4.39: World Map, Cutwail Botnet
4.2. CUTWAIL 49
The Inbound and Outbound number of peers were very dierent, generating very dierent maps,
so it was deided to only present the Inbound peers in the map.
Figure 4.40: World Map, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
In these pitures, it is visible that the infeted mahine ommuniated with mahines from all
ontinents. The main infeted ones are however Europe and Asia.
Unlike on the rst apture, the amount of Inbound and Outbound peers is very similar, whih
originated very similar World Maps. So following the same riteria, we only onsidered Inbound
peers.
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4.2.3 Low-Level Analysis
Here are the Salograms from the two aptures:
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Figure 4.41: Salogram, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.42: Salogram, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
The last two salograms are similar. Despite the fat that the rst has more peaks, the seond
learly has a more visible peak in the analysed signal around minute 130. This is easily explained by
the high variane signal that is present in the seond apture. However, both salograms have a fairly
regular behaviour, despite their dierent values.
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Figure 4.43: Energy Mean, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.44: Energy Mean, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
The last pitures show that the mean values of the energy of the salograms are quite dierent
from eah other, as expeted. However, if we only observe the line behaviour, they are similar: both
present an initial peak, followed by a signiant derease, and after that they start presenting a regular
inrease.
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Figure 4.45: Energy Variane, Cutwail Botnet
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Figure 4.46: Energy Variane, Cutwail Botnet(2nd Capture)
The variane analysis shows very dierent results. In the rst ase, we an observe that the
maximum value is around 16, while in the seond ase it is lose to 250. This obviously leads to very
dierent graphs.
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4.3 Bobax
The malware used from this Botnet was downloaded from [35℄ on July 2011. The rest of the analysis
proess followed the same onditions of the previous Botnets analysis.
The tra obtained in the seond apture did not reveal any relevant hanges when ompared
to the rst apture, so it was not inluded in this doument. It is important to point out that this
apture was the one that generated more tra.
4.3.1 General analysis
The tra from Bobax followed the same behaviour throughout the whole duration of the apture.
Right away after the malware was installed, a lot of DNS queries were exhanged in port 1042, known
for being used by trojans. Atually, many of these queries were atually under the Unknown UDP
label that will be shown next. In this apture, we also observed a lot of SMTP pakets (only in 1st
hour). Most of them were under the Unknown TCP label. Some HTTP pakets were also exhanged,
and sporadially some HTTP/XML Notify messages. HTTP was the seond most used protool of
the Unknown TCP pakets. However, these pakets were mostly SMB pakets. Around 400 thousand
SMB pakets were exhanged per hour. It was also possible to observe some NBNS pakets.
Unknown UDP pakets were one again mainly used for DoS attaks, using ports that are known
to be used for that type of attaks.
This Botnet denitely behave like expeted, onsidering its amount of HTTP tra, DNS lookups,
DoS attaks and, essentially, SMTP pakets.
4.3.2 High-Level Analysis
One again, the protools involved in the generated tra were analysed.
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Figure 4.47: Protools(Upload), Bobax Botnet
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Figure 4.48: Protools(Download), Bobax Botnet
In these two pitures, it is visible that most of the generated tra was ltered as unknown TCP.
The Upload piture, despite showing only Unknown TCP tra, also ontains tra from all the
other protools, although in a muh lower quantity.
In the Download piture, it is possible to see a lear pattern in DNS, SMB, SMTP, Unknown
UDP and HTTP pakets. Again, they have relatively small numbers when ompared to the number
of Unknown TCP pakets.
As explained before, the vast majority of Unknown TCP pakets are SMB pakets, although there
are also HTTP pakets and some pakets from other protools. Unknown UDP pakets are mostly
DNS pakets or pakets used for DoS attempts.
Next, the number of pakets generated per hour and per minute was also analysed.
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Figure 4.49: Pakets per hour, Bobax Botnet
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The amount of pakets per hour observed in the previous piture is a lear sign that we are faing
Botnet generated tra. This should be an instant warning to take measures to protet the infeted
mahine. It is also important to stress the dierene between the number of Upload and Download
pakets. The amount of Upload pakets are in the order of 470 thousand pakets per hour, while
Download pakets are in the order of 40 thousand pakets. There are no signiant peaks on the
tra generated that should be pointed out.
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Figure 4.50: Pakets per minute, Bobax Botnet
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Figure 4.51: Sample of pakets per minute, Bobax Botnet
56 CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
From the previous pitures it is possible to observe that the number of pakets per minute still have
a visible pattern, speially for Download pakets. This Botnet generates more than eight thousand
pakets per minute.
The next step onsisted in alulating the amount of generated data, from the aptured pakets
pakets. Following the same proedures that were used before, we obtained the statistis that are
shown next.
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Figure 4.52: Amount of tra per hour, Bobax Botnet
The previous piture shows that, despite the huge dierene that exists in the number of Uploaded
and Downloaded pakets, the dierene in the amount of tra is not so signiant. Uploaded pakets
are responsible for a rate of around 30MB per hour, while Downloaded pakets generate around 5MB
per hour. Again, there are no signiant peaks in the amount of generated tra, whih results in a
lear typial behavioural pattern.
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Figure 4.53: Amount of tra per minute, Bobax Botnet
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Figure 4.54: Sample of amount of tra per minute, Bobax Botnet
When observing the amount of tra per minute, it is harder to get a lear pattern due to the
varianes that exist over time. The amount of generated data is not signiant, being around 600KB
per minute. So, an analysis exlusively based on this statisti would not raise muh suspiions, exept
for the regularity that is observed.
Let us now analyse the amount of unique peers ontated over time, whih an be seen in the next
piture.
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Figure 4.55: Unique peers per hour, Bobax Botnet
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Even in the number of ontated peers, we have a lear behavioural pattern. The observed values
raise suspiions about Botnet infetion, beause they are in the order of 225 thousand peers per hour.
The next proedure onsists of analysing the TCP Session Establishment attempts. This analysis
an be seen in the following pitures.
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Figure 4.56: TCP Session Establishment(Outbound), Bobax Botnet
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Figure 4.57: TCP Session Establishment(Inbound), Bobax Botnet
From the previous pitures we an see that most of the SYN pakets did not obtain any reply.
Only a small number was replied with the RST/ACK ags set, and an even smaller number with the
SYN/ACK ags.
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To onlude this interesting Botnet High-Level analysis, it is interesting to see a world map showing
the loation of the peers that ommuniated with the infeted mahine.
Figure 4.58: World Map, Bobax Botnet
Bobax's infeted mahines are loated everywhere in the world, although we an defend that the
most infeted ontinents are Europe and Ameria. The ountries that suer more infetions are the
United States of Ameria and China.
In this ase, as it was seen in the number of peers, there are many more Outbound than Inbound
onnetions. This, as expeted, lead to two dierent World Maps, resulting in a higher amount of
blak dots, representing the Outbound peers. In order to observe the dierenes, we will present a
World Map that onsiders Outbound peers.
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Figure 4.59: World Map, Bobax Botnet(Outbound Connetions)
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4.3.3 Low-Level Analysis
The salogram is shown in the next Figure. next,
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Figure 4.60: Salogram, Bobax Botnet
This salogram shows that there are high perentages of energy lose to the beginning and the
end of the analysed signal. Besides those two points, and as it has been onrmed on the high level
analysis, the signal is very similar over time with very few peaks. So, this graph shows the low variane
of the signal, exept for the higher sales.
Analysing now the mean and the variane of the energy, we obtained the following results:
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Figure 4.61: Energy Mean, Bobax Botnet
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Figure 4.62: Energy Variane, Bobax Botnet
Both metris present a similar behaviour, always showing an inrease as the sale inreases.
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4.4 Lethi
Tra was aptured during a 48 hours period, in order to make a deep analysis of this Botnet
behaviour. The malware used was downloaded from [35℄ on September of 2011.
Like Bobax, the tra obtained in the seond apture was pretty muh similar to the tra of the
rst one, so one again it was not onsidered in this doument.
4.4.1 General analysis
After the malware was installed, a signiant number of DNS queries started to be exhanged. Then
many NBNS queries start being exhanged regularly. They use port 137, whih has been reported to
be used by the trojan Msinit. Unknown TCP tra, whih will be presented in the next subsetion,
is atually mostly omposed by HTTP pakets using the alternate port 8090. There are also some
DHCP pakets exhanged, informing and aknowledging. Some HTTP pakets that were attempting
to hange the Certiates List were also deteted, and some were followed by a paket ontaining
info for the Certiate Revoation List. Besides, among Unknown TCP pakets, some SMB pakets
were also disovered, as well as pakets going through port 6000, whih is a port usually used by
virus/trojans. Unknown UDP pakets are suspeted to be used for DoS attaks, beause they use
ports between 33435 and 33438, whih are typially used for this type of attaks. Finally, only a
ouple of SMTP pakets were generated.
We an then onlude that this Botnet, despite not having generated too muh SMTP pakets,
unlike it was expeted, generated a signiant amount of HTTP pakets, inluding attempts for
Certiate List hanges. The number of NBNS pakets also surpassed the expetations. The rest of
the results are as expeted, exept the total amount of generated pakets.
4.4.2 High-Level Analysis
The protools involved in the tra generated by this Botnet an be seen in the next gures.
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Figure 4.63: Protools(Upload), Lethi Botnet
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Figure 4.64: Protools(Download), Lethi Botnet
In this apture we have two major protools involved, DNS and Unknown TCP. In the Upload
diretion, we have also some Unknown UDP pakets, and the amount of DNS pakets is higher than the
amount of Unknown TCP pakets. When analysing the number of Download pakets, this situation
reverses.
As explained in the General Analysis, Unknown TCP pakets are mostly HTTP pakets, as well
as SMB pakets.
Let us now analyse the number of pakets generated per hour and per minute.
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Figure 4.65: Pakets per hour, Lethi Botnet
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The previous piture presents a simple pattern in the number of pakets per hour. The amount of
Uploaded pakets is around six times higher than the amount of Downloaded pakets. There are not
any relevant hanges in the amount of generated tra that worth to be pointed out.
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Figure 4.66: Pakets per minute, Lethi Botnet
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Figure 4.67: Sample of pakets per minute, Lethi Botnet
From the last two pitures, the variane in the Botnet behaviour beomes more pereivable. The
numbers presented are not enough to raise any suspiions that we are faing a possible Botnet infetion.
From the aptured pakets we alulated the amount of generated data. Following the same riteria
of the previous proedures, we obtained the statistis shown in the next page.
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Figure 4.68: Amount of tra per hour, Lethi Botnet
This piture is pretty similar to the one orresponding to the amount of pakets per hour. As
expeted, the dierene between Upload and Download pakets is maintained and the ratio between
them is approximately the same. The same simple pattern an be observed.
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Figure 4.69: Amount of tra per minute, Lethi Botnet
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Figure 4.70: Sample of amount of tra per minute, Lethi Botnet
One again, this is pretty similar to the amount of pakets per minute. This proedure, by itself,
ould not raise any suspiion sine it generated around 1.5KB per minute, whih is a very low value.
The amount of unique peers ontated over time revealed interesting values. This an be seen in
the next piture.
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45
Pe
er
s
Hours
Inbound
Outbound
Figure 4.71: Unique peers per hour, Lethi Botnet
Despite having a rate of around 5 peers per hour, there is a peak around hours 20 and 47. The
peaks, as it was seen in the Protools details, happen beause of the inrease of Unknown TCP pakets
using port 8090, therefore HTTP pakets.
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The next proedure onsisted of analysing the TCP Session Establishment attempts. The results
an be seen in the next gure.
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Figure 4.72: TCP Session Establishment(Outbound), Lethi Botnet
From the previous piture we an say that most of the SYN pakets did not obtain any reply. Only
a small number replied with the RST/ACK ags ative or with the SYN/ACK ags ative.
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Figure 4.73: TCP Session Establishment(Inbound), Lethi Botnet
In this ase, most of the reeived SYN pakets have not been replied bak. This reveals an anomaly
in the ommuniation, meaning that we are faing a Botnet infetion.
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To onlude this analysis, let us look at the world map showing the loation of the peers that
ommuniated with the infeted mahine.
Figure 4.74: World Map, Lethi Botnet
This Botnet did not generate muh tra and most of the infeted mahines that were deteted
in this apture are from China and the United States of Ameria.
We have already observed that there is a onstant rate of Outbound peers, whih leads to a World
Map with only three dots in the entire World. So, for this analysis we only onsidered Inbound peers.
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4.4.3 Low-Level Analysis
To onlude the analysis on the Botnets, we present the salogram for the Lethi apture.
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Figure 4.75: Lethi, Bobax Botnet
The last salogram presents a similar behaviour to the Bobax salogram. It also presents high
perentages of energy lose to the beginning and end of the trae. It is also possible to see the lower
oeients and the pattern they follow. This is easily explained by the variane of the signal over
time.
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Figure 4.76: Energy Mean, Lethi Botnet
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Figure 4.77: Energy Variane, Lethi Botnet
One again the mean and the variane have quite distint values. Both show a peak at the initial
moments, followed by a derease and a regular inrease until the end of the analysed signal.
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4.5 Kazy
The malware used for this trojan was downloaded from [35℄ on April 2011. Tra was aptured for
a period of 48 hours, in order to make a deeper analysis.
This malware reated a new proess every time it was exeuted, disguised under the name iex-
plorer.exe, whih is a ommon behaviour of this trojan, or malware.exe, whih was the name of the
exeuted malware.
Three aptures were made for this trojan. The seond apture produed some really interesting
values, very dierent from the rst apture, but due to a tehnial issue (an energy fail), the length
of the apture was redued to 30 hours. In an attempt to repliate the same results, a third apture
was made, but unfortunately the results obtained were pretty similar to the rst apture. Thus,
even though the seond apture was inomplete, we deided to inlude the rst two aptures in this
dissertation.
4.5.1 General analysis
After the trojan malware was downloaded and installed, a signiant number of DNS queries were
exhanged. After the initial burst of DNS pakets, HTTP pakets started being exhanged. After
that, the major part of the exhanged tra was Unknown TCP, that will be seen in the High-Level
Analysis. Most of this tra was HTTP on port 80 for the rst hour; after this rst hour, port 50000
started being used, whih is a port known to be used by the Subsari malware. But the most part
of the generated Unknown TCP pakets were SMB pakets. The trojan maintained this behaviour
until the end of the apture. Only a ouple of SMTP pakets were disovered in the Unknown TCP
pakets.
The results of the seond apture were not quite dierent from the ones orresponding to the rst
apture. Without onsidering the amount of pakets generated, they also started with a burst of
DNS queries. After that, HTTP and SMB pakets were exhanged, with SMB orresponding to the
highest perentage. Then, after the rst hour and until the end of the apture, most of the generated
tra was Unknown TCP. Analyzing this unknown TCP tra, we ould onlude that it is mostly
omposed by SMB pakets. There were also some HTTP pakets throughout the apture, besides
HTTP pakets using port 81. This port is usually used by a malware named RemoConChubo. Like
happened in the rst apture, port 50000 (usually used by Subsari) was present.
We an then onlude that this trojan, despite not generating a signiant number of SMTP
pakets, unlike it was expeted, generated a signiant amount of HTTP pakets, both through
port 80 and 81. The number of SMB pakets was also dierent from the expeted behaviour. This
strongly indiates that the objetive of this trojan is to perform DoS attaks, as well as nding private
information in the infeted mahine. The rest of the results are as expeted, and the three aptures
made for this trojan were very useful.
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4.5.2 High-Level Analysis
This trojan generated the following tra distribution among dierent Protools.
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Figure 4.78: Protools(Download), Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.79: Protools(Download), Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
By analyzing both aptures, we an state that the most present protools were SMB and Unknown
TCP. In the rst apture, it is possible to also see some DNS pakets, as well as HTTP pakets. In
the seond apture all protools an be observed, exept SMTP.
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Figure 4.80: Protools(Upload), Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.81: Protools(Upload), Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
The number of Downloaded pakets is very similar to the number of Uploaded pakets. The biggest
dierene is in the seond apture, where the number of Downloaded pakets have an almost steady
rate of sixty thousand Unknown TCP pakets per hour, while Uploaded pakets are around twenty
thousand Unknown TCP pakets. In the Upload diretion we also have some Unknown UDP pakets,
and the amount of DNS pakets is higher than the amount of Unknown TCP pakets. When analyzing
the Download pakets, this situation reverses. It is also important to note the dierene in the number
of SMB pakets. They were around four thousand per hour in the Upload diretion, being almost
insigniant in the Download diretion.
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As it was already disussed, it is important to point out that the Unknown TCP pakets were
mostly SMB pakets for the rst apture, while on the seond they were almost from SMB and
HTTP. Unknown UDP pakets were mostly used for DoS attaks on both aptures.
The next analysis was related to the amount of generated pakets, and the statistis illustrated in
the following gures were obtained.
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Figure 4.82: Pakets per hour, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.83: Pakets per hour, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
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The number of pakets generated in the rst apture does not have a very errati pattern, exept
for the two visible peaks. In the seond apture, the pattern is really lear. It is important to note
that in the rst hour the number of Upload pakets is very small when ompared to the number at
any other hour.
This analysis provides valuable information. In the rst apture, the tra generated would not
be enough to laim that we were faing a trojan infetion, but in the seond apture this learly
resembles a ase of infetion. The normal rate of Upload pakets in the seond apture was around
six hundred thousand pakets per hour.
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Figure 4.84: Pakets per minute, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.85: Pakets per minute, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
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Figure 4.86: Sample of pakets per minute, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.87: Sample of pakets per minute, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
The last four pitures were made to highlight the behaviour of the generated pakets. As it is
visible, there are various bursts of pakets, speially on the seond apture. We an see in the sample
of the seond apture that the normal rate is around ten thousand pakets per minute, but oasionally
there are bursts of six hundred thousand pakets per minute. The rst apture has a more regular
rate of pakets, without muh variane.
The next analysis onsisted in observing the amount of data generated from those pakets. Fol-
lowing the same riteria used in the previous proedures, we obtained the statistis that are shown in
the next page.
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Figure 4.88: Amount of tra per hour, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.89: Amount of tra per hour, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
These two images show that the behaviour is very similar to what was seen in the number of
pakets per hour. The rst apture presents the same two peaks as before, and the seond also shows
no relevant peaks. For the rst apture, the values of the amount of tra per hour are regular, with
a very short amount of generated tra. The seond apture is a dierent ase, where the amount of
tra an raise an alarm beause the average rate of Uploaded pakets is around 40MB per hour.
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Figure 4.90: Amount of tra per minute, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.91: Amount of tra per minute, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
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Figure 4.92: Sample of amount of tra per minute, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.93: Sample of amount of tra per minute, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
One again, the seond apture presents a high variane on the amount of generated tra. The
rst apture follows a similar pattern as the one observed in the pakets per minute statisti. The
sample from the seond apture learly shows the dierene in behaviour that is exhibited by this
trojan between the rst and the seond hours.
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The next step was to analyse the number of peers involved.
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Figure 4.94: Unique peers per hour, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.95: Unique peers per hour, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
The rst apture did not raise muh suspiions, with an average of near ten peers per hour and
one peak loated around hour 18, with around 60 peers. This peak leads to an inrease on the TCP
Session Establishment attempts. Meanwhile, the seond apture provided a very dierent result. The
number of peers ontated per hour was in the order of 290 thousand peers. There were no signiant
peaks registered in the seond apture, just an inrease from the rst hour to the remaining of the
apture.
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Next, TCP Session Establishments were analyzed. The results an be seen in the following pitures.
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Figure 4.96: TCP Session Establishment(Outbound), Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.97: TCP Session Establishment(Outbound), Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
In the rst apture we see that there are more SYN/ACK than SYN pakets. This value is not
normal and is an indiation of a possible infetion. There are a ouple of RST/ACK pakets as well,
but in average lower than the number of SYN pakets.
In the seond piture, we see that there is a huge amount of generated SYN pakets, and the
major part of them do not have any response, either SYN/ACK or RST/ACK. This suggests a
possible infetion, sine this number is not normal.
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Figure 4.98: TCP Session Establishment(Inbound), Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.99: TCP Session Establishment(Inbound), Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
In the last two pitures, the situation hanges. In the rst one, most of the SYN pakets have a
reply. In the rst hours most of the SYN pakets were replied with a RST/ACK, but after hour 20 the
number of SYN/ACK as RST/ACK pakets were almost always the same. The amount of generated
RST/ACK are a warning to take further ations.
The seond piture shows a similar behaviour to the Outbound attempts. The number of SYN
pakets reeived, however, dropped from six hundred thousand to around four thousand pakets.
Therefore, it is easier to observe the SYN/ACK and RST/ACK pakets sent. Nonetheless, a lot of
SYN pakets did not obtain any reply. One again, this suggests that we are faing an infetion.
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Some world maps representing the loation of the peers that ommuniated with the infeted
mahine were also made.
Figure 4.100: World Map, Kazy Botnet
Figure 4.101: World Map, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
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In the rst apture, we an observe that most of the peers are from Europe and Ameria. The
main infeted ountries are China and the United States of Ameria. The seond apture, however,
generated a totally dierent map. Basially, all ontinents had a lot of infeted mahines. The most
aeted ontinents are Europe and Ameria. The ountries that seem more aeted are however,
Russia and the United States of Ameria. This piture shows very well the propagation of this trojan
and the danger it poses.
Regarding the Inbound/Outbound amount of peers, we already observed that in the rst apture
they were very similar. This originated two idential World Maps, so only Inbound data was onsid-
ered. However, in the seond apture, we saw that there were many more Outbound than Inbound
peers. As suspeted, this resulted in two dierent World Maps. In order to better understand their
dierene, we deided to inlude it.
Figure 4.102: World Map, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture, Outbound Connetions)
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4.5.3 Low-Level Analysis
To end this hapter, two salograms were generated, one for eah apture.
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Figure 4.103: Salogram, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.104: Salogram, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
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The last two salograms show very well the dierene between the rst and seond aptures. This
rst only reveals a signiant inrease in energy perentage around minute 110 and 380, where there
is a higher variane on the analysed signal. The rest of the salogram follow a fairly regular pattern,
without muh variane. Meanwhile, the seond reveals a huge perentage of energy at the beginning
and end of the time sale, like happened in other salograms. It also has a peak in the energy
perentage around minute 60, ontrasting with the rst hour where the signal energy was almost null.
This high variane on the signal was the reason for the peak.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Scales a
M
ea
n
Figure 4.105: Energy Mean, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.106: Energy Mean, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
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These last two pitures also stress the dierene between both aptures. The rst has a peak
around the initial moments followed by a regular inrease until the end of the signal. The seond
presents a steady inrease from the beginning to the end of the signal. The values in both aptures
are also very dierent, as expeted.
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Figure 4.107: Energy Variane, Kazy Botnet
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Figure 4.108: Energy Variane, Kazy Botnet(2nd Capture)
Comparing the variane, the results were similar to what was observed on the mean analysis. One
again, the rst apture presents a peak in the rst moments, followed by a small regular inrease, and
the seond presents a steady inrease. Again, the values between the two are very dierent, as well
as their behaviour.
Chapter 5
Conlusions
5.1 Final onlusions
Most of the initial objetives for this dissertation were aomplished. The haraterization of the
dierent types of Botnets was fullled. It was interesting to observe the evolution from the rst
IRC Botnets to urrent state of the art Botnets. After an initial researh about the top HTTP
Spam Botnets, some popular Botnets were seleted, installed and suessfully studied, leading us to
onlude that they performed as expeted. It was also interesting to see the update on the top Botnets
and observe that the suspiions that Lethi would beome quite relevant beame true. After some
attempts, it was possible to nd malware for all the seleted Botnets. These HTTP spam Botnets
were deeply studied and analysed. Although the tra generated in the infeted mahine was not
always as expeted, many ommon behaviours were found, learly indiating the objetive of the
used malware. Being able to geographially loate the infeted mahines was also very important to
observe the spread of the analyzed Botnets. Being able to apture tra in dierent onditions and
using more realisti environments ould also be very important, possibly leading to a more aurate
analysis.
Due to the evolution of the Botnets, it is beoming harder to haraterize their tra, sine they
tend to disguise themselves, ypher their tra and present more intermittent ativity. From the anal-
ysis that was onduted in this dissertation, it was possible to understand that HTTP Botnets mainly
fous on searhing for private information (ommuniating the olleted information via HTTP) and
sending Spam emails.
5.2 Future Work
The following topis should be onsidered for future work:
 Make longer aptures
 Improve the low-level analysis
 Implement detetion mehanisms
 Inlude more realisti simulation environments
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 Use dierent Operating Systems.
Longer aptures would mean a larger time window, whih ould inrease the probability of apturing
more dierent behaviours from the Botnets. We know that many Botnets only operate stritly when
they need to, showing behaviors dierent from normal.
Salograms should be further explored in order to look for more behavioural patterns that an
help in the Botnet detetion phase. This ould inlude a deeper analysis of the generated pakets, a
deeper look at the ports used in the ommuniations, among other tehniques.
It is very important to implement detetion mehanisms and take defensive measures when an
infetion is deteted. Using the aptures and statistis of this dissertation, it would be interesting to
implement rules that ould be used to detet and prevent infetions and see how they would perform.
Another very important topi is to inlude more realisti simulation environments. In this dis-
sertation, the mahine was only used to beome infeted and apture tra, and all this happened
after being formatted. It would be important to inlude a more realisti mahine, similar to a regular
mahine. It would be also useful to infet an already infeted mahine with another malware from a
dierent Botnet, to see if they would perform independently, or if one of the Botnets ould aet the
other.
At last, it would be interesting to explore the same mehanisms that were used here in dierent
Operating Systems.
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